work related

I was planning on posting on NFL football today. I had some observations about the season so far, the inequities of tomorrow night's game being available in so few markets (but available at my house!), the tragedy of Sean Taylor's passing, and so on. However, Dirk Reeves refused to plead guilty and instead I have to spend tomorrow in my third trial against him in three weeks and fourth in the past six. I spent the day preparing for that, not researching a blog post.

This Reeves man will not give up when he's beaten. It's obvious that he has a poorly developed sense of risk and reward or he wouldn't find himself in his current predicament. If he had any sense at all, he would leapt at the chance for the misdemeanor disposition on his auto theft case I offered yesterday, but no. Additionally, he has been appointed an attorney at state expense, so the fact that his cases will now take up a total of at least seven days of court time has ZERO impact on him.

Here lies one of the greatest problems with the public defender system as it exists in Colorado - there is zero incentive for many people who qualify for a public defender to accept plea offers. In Colorado, people who are accused of crime and can demonstrate some financial need are appointed attorneys at no cost to themselves. Consider the implications of this - commit a crime, claim you're poor and you get a highly qualified and well paid professional to defend you - free! This may sound excellent in theory, but it is bad in practice. One of the primary motivators to settlement in all legal disputes is the cost involved in protracted litigation. A person of modest means who does not qualify for a public defender might asked to pay $1500 or more for representation in a simple felony or DUI [DWI for some of you] case. If the case were to go to trial, the person would be expected to pay an additional $2500-5000 per day of trial, plus money for any pretrial litigation. The "indigent" pay absolutely nothing. Why not impose a nominal fee depending on the extent of representation they require on these people to create an incentive to settlement? For example, if you settle your case without trial, preliminary hearing, or other litigation, pay one amount; if you litigate, pay a little more, and so on. All other people face the regular pro/con decision-making tree about their legal decisions, why are the poor insulated from this choice?

You should also keep in mind that most crime is committed by young men. Young men are among the most employable demographics. If these men are poor, it is often because of their criminal choices, and not for any other reason. This is particularly true in our area where jobs in the gas fields pay $20-28/hour for unskilled labor. In other words, most defendants in my experience get free attorneys because they are lazy sociopaths, and not for any other reason.

This is an idea that deserves further development, and I lack the time right now. Tomorrow I'm back in battle in court. What are your thoughts on gratis representation of the 'indigent?' Do you need more info? How would you solve this problem? Is it even a problem? Let me know what you think